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Abstract 
In this article, I discuss the lessons from the South Korea’s digital switchover, considering its 
development in the process and the remaining challenges. South Korea completed the digital 
switchover on 31st December 2012 but the analogue cable conversion to digital cable has not 
yet been completed for some 10 million households. Furthermore, mere 2.6% of all the 
households eligible for the government support benefitted from the support scheme. Although 
Korea embarked on its journey towards digital television relatively early, its progress has 
been slow and the outcome was only a partial success. I examine the national politics leading 
up to pilot programs for eliminating analogue television signals in two phases: Wuljin, 
Kangjin and Danyang during September and November 2010, followed by Jeju in June 2011. 
Based on these experiences and the diagnosis of the current situation after the switchover, I 
conclude that the South Korea’s digital switchover is a partial success and there is continued 
need for a centralized hub collaborating between the government, the broadcasters, and the 
television manufacturers to communicate more effectively and to increase public awareness 
to overcome the remaining challenges. 
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The digital switchover of television has become a global trend and South Korea (hereafter 
Korea) is no exception. The first country to switch off analogue terrestrial television was the 
Netherlands (in 2006) and it was relatively simple because terrestrial reception has long been 
of minor importance to the Dutch, with 92 percent of 6.7 million households already 
subscribing to cable (Starks 2007: 174). Their digital terrestrial service Digitenne, launched 
2003, was free and covered 98 percent of the country (Starks 2007: 174). Most countries 
which have met early dates for analogue switch-off have had advanced levels of DTV 
penetration (with the exception of the UK). For example, Finland and Sweden had in 2007-8 
DTV penetration of above 50 percent (Iosifidis 2011: 9-10). The UK, with the highest DTV 
adoption in Europe, started to switch off analogue signals on a region-by-region basis, and 
has completed the process in 2012 (www.digitaluk.co.uk). The switchover to digital 
television has also been accomplished in Japan in July 2011 (Kumabe 2012) and the 
switchover in China is scheduled for 2015. Market conditions and other factors affecting the 
switchover in these countries are diverse but the following points can be drawn: the countries 
that have successfully gone through the switchover process had either relatively small 
markets with high subscription rates to cable and satellite, or they already had advanced 
levels of DTV penetration, or they had both. 
After the digital switchover nationwide on the 31st of December 2012, some 10 million 
households of analogue cable service subscribers are not yet converted. In addition, the 
Korean government still maintains an analogue system for TV transmissions across the 
border as the convertor boxes needed to view Korea’s digital TV on an analogue set are not 
available in North Korea (Yonhap News 25th December 2012; Interview with Son 2013). 
Although Korea embarked on a journey towards digital switchover relatively early, this 
article explains how its progress has been slowed by political challenges which led to the 
decision to terminate analogue broadcasting all at once, rather than region by region. 
From the Korean government’s perspective, the objective of switchover was to keep abreast 
of changing television and telecommunications technology and to achieve greater spectrum 
efficiency by ending analogue terrestrial transmission. The motives for the switchover have 
been, however, more than a consumer focus on ‘better TV’. A free spectrum can be sold to 
users (usually entirely commercial) for services, such as mobile data. Another motive has 
been to respond to business demands for network communication capabilities beyond 
television. 
There have been many critiques of digital switchover. The most pressing one is that the 
policies for digital television are largely determined by markets and political contexts 
(Iosifidis 2011) rather than the benefit of ordinary viewers. For consumers, digital reception 
imposes an additional cost to acquire the equipment needed to access digital signals 
(Colapinto and Papandrea 2007: 40). For some, the additional cost may not be justified by the 
improved picture quality and other technical attributes of digital television. Consequently, in 
the absence of significant additional benefits, those consumers will tend to delay their 
investment in digital receiving equipment until their existing analogue equipment needs 
updating or replacing (Colapinto and Papadrea 2007: 40). Since there is no compatibility 
between analogue TV, as there was historically between black and white TV and colour TV, 
digital TV brings uncertainty as a disruptive technology that brings changes in existing order 
(Galperin 2002). Another concern is the environmental damage caused by digital switchovers. 
Korea’s neighbour, Japan, witnessed a dramatic increase in illegal disposal of analogue 
television sets in the years leading up to the complete switch-off, from 67,838 sets nationwide 
in 2007 to 81,427 sets in 2009 (Sankei News 7th July 2011). Further critiques of switchover 
point to the dominance of telecommunication giants already in the marketplace and the 
elimination of public broadcasters who do not have access to digital distribution technology 
(Interview with Hardy 2011). The use of technology will boost consumerism over any other 
forms of interactivity (Interview with Hardy 2011). While acknowledging these critiques, this 
article focuses on the early stages leading to the Korean switchover and a diagnosis of 
problems which accompanied two pilot programs for early switchover. Those problems 
persisted during the switchover process and still remain unsolved as witnessed in the case of 
analogue cable conversion to digital cable. 
The last decade witnessed an increase in research about digital switchover. Brown and Picard 
(2005) and Iosifidis (2005, 2006, 2011) considered the topic in the European context and 
Cave and Nakamura (2006) compared experiences in the Americas, Europe and Japan. 
Further comparative studies include Galperin (2004) (between America and Britain) and 
Garcia Leiva, Starks and Tambini (2006) (between Europe, the United States and Japan). 
However, Korea has rarely been explored with the exception of Jung’s (2010a) study of the 
legal background and the policy issues in the switchover. This study aims to fill this lacuna.i 
To do this, I consult government documents, consultation papers, academic publications as 
well as reports by the Korea Communications Commission (hereafter KCC), DTV Korea, and 
the Korea Radio Promotion Association (hereafter RAPA). I also conducted in-depth 
interviews with two KCC and DTV Korea staff between December 2010 and January 2013. 
Based on these, I discuss the recent development of digital switchover, identify the 
challenges, and propose the implementation of more effective communication strategy and 
the introduction of free digital television, KoreaView, in order to complete the switchover of 
cable services. 
 
Background and development  
Since the 1980s, the US has pressured Korea to liberalize its markets in the name of 
globalization, including various media sectors. Many citizens, fed up with long years of state 
media control, supported media marketization in the 1990s (Shim 2008: 15). The 
deregulation and opening up of the Korean media industry has been gradual but consistent. 
For example, it took six years (1998-2004) for the government to allow the importation of 
Japanese popular culture, for example, reversing a decades-old ban since its liberation from 
Japanese colonial rule in 1945 (Lee, D.H. 2008: 157).  
In 1991, the Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) became the first commercial broadcaster 
Korea, ending an oligopoly of two public broadcasters, the Korea Broadcasting System 
(KBS) and the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). This marked the end of dual 
funding scheme that combined licence fees and advertising revenue as part of the Korean 
public service broadcasting since the introduction of television in the late 1950s. Cable 
television services started in March 1995 and satellite channels were added in 2002 (Shim 
2008: 23). In December 2010, the KCC abolished the traditional cross-ownership restrictions 
and deregulated the media marketplace by allowing the major newspapers’ entry to 
broadcasting (Kim,T.H. 2010). Whilst the KCC contends that deregulation is crucial for the 
growth of the media industry, critics have raised concerns that liberalization compromised 
ownership diversity and that the increased competition will lead to a ‘media bloodbath’ (Kim, 
T.H. 2010).  
The transition to digital TV is expected to impact the television industry in various ways. The 
process is expensive and takes time. The KCC reports that the total cost for digital switchover 
(including HD programme production and digital transmission facilities) for the major 
broadcasters (KBS, MBC and SBS) alone is expected to be around £1.5 billion by 2012 
(Kang 2008: 16). In 2007, only half of the regional TV stations have completed the 
digitisation process (KCC 2008: 15). Cable TV operators are also expected to spend some 
£2.2 billion by 2012 (Sung 2009). The cable industry is concerned that analogue cable 
subscribers need to be converted and that cable TV operators need to collaborate with 
terrestrial broadcasters to provide higher quality programmes via the digital cable set-top 
boxes. Satellite digital platform, SkyLife, started in March 2002 (Cho 2004) and it has now 
over 3 million subscribers, half of which are HD subscribers (YTN 24th March 2011).  
Digital switchover initiatives in Korea began in the late 1990s (KCC and DTV Korea 2010: 
8). Since the government’s announcement on the move to all-digital transmission, its decision 
to adopt America’s ATSC system has been controversial. It was not made explicit as to why 
this system was preferred (RAPA 2008: 27). The Korean Ministry of Information and 
Communication was reluctant to respond to the calls for the field test to compare the 
American system and the European system (DVB-T/COFDM) (RAPA 2008: 26). The strong 
resistance from the terrestrial broadcasters was based on the lack of platform interoperability 
of ATSC. At the time, North Korea was rumored to be adopting the European PAL system 
which it shared with adjacent China (Interview with Choi 2010). Broadcasters saw the 
European system as technically superior and a more economically viable option in the long 
run (in case of unification between North and South). In opting for the American system over 
an industry-centred voice, the government evaded a process of ‘rational-legal authority’ 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004: 55). Although a committee set up a field test in January 2004 in 
response to complaints from the industry, viewers and academics regarding ATSC’s 
performance (Kang 2008: 26), the committee lasted only 5 months before agreeing ATSC 
would remain. 
To make up for the lack of ATSC’s platform interoperability, the government approved DMB 
as a hybrid form of mobile broadcast television on mobile telephones designed by Digital 
Audio Broadacsting (DAB) (Starks 2007: 180). Korea emerged in mid-2005 a global test 
market for DMB (Shin 2006: 1145). This solution recognized the existing market and socio-
cultural conditions in Korea where there is a high penetration of mobile telephony and social 
media usage. This experience illuminates the beginnings of a power struggle between the 
government and the broadcasters. The government has been reluctant to give a prominent role 
to broadcasters and the whole process lack a centralise hub for decision making. This would 
be indicative of later problems in the digital switchover.  
Indeed as stated by Starks (2007: 200), no country has embarked on full digital switchover 
without first launching digital terrestrial TV and no country has launched digital terrestrial 
TV without also intending to switch off analogue terrestrial services. Following the 
government’s Digital TV Action Plan, digital terrestrial television (DTT) broadcasting began 
in October 2001. First available in the metropolitan area, DTT service expanded gradually its 
reach region-by-region over the next five years (KCC and DTV Korea 2010: 8). A key to this 
plan obliged the existing terrestrial broadcasters to simulcast their analogue service in digital 
HDTV for five years, provided that at the end of 2006, DTT would reach 95 percent of the 
population. This was an optimistic target, considering that the survey in November 2005 
showed that a mere 12.8 percent had adopted DTT (RAPA, 2008: 29). DTT use has been on 
the rise (58.7 percent in 2010) (KCC 2010: 3) but is not yet sufficient. All Korean terrestrial 
broadcasters were still simulcasting in 2012.  
The government then announced the Digital Switchover Action Plan in March 2008, the same 
year as the establishment of the KCC under the office of the President. The KCC marked the 
consolidation of the former Korean Broadcasting Commission (KBC) and the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC). It is the governmental organization responsible for 
both policy-making and regulation in broadcasting and communications. The KCC has 
spearheaded an ambitious attempt by the government to deregulate the Korean media 
marketplace (Kim 2010). Critics have rightly been concerned about the KCC’s political 
independence. Of its five permanent Commissioners, two are appointed by the President. The 
other three are recommended through the National Assembly, one by the President’s party 
and the other two by opposition parties (www.kcc.go.kr). KCC Chairman Si-Jung Choi 
resigned in early 2012 over allegations he bribed senior government officials (Yonhap News 
27th January 2012).  
DTV Korea launched in October 2008 and the government announced details around early 
switch-offs in June 2009. By April 2010, these details were finalised and the target date for a 
complete switchover was set. This could be seen as a political decision with the switch-off 
immediately following the Presidential election in December 2012. As Grcia Leiva and 
Starks (2010: 789) elaborate on the U.S. experience, this is the time frame when newly 
elected politicians could still blame their predecessors for the policy decision. Wuljin, 
Kangjin, Danyang and Jeju were selected to test a complete switch-off for two reasons. First, 
these towns had small populations, and thus were suitable for the pilot. Second, due to these 
towns’ remote locations, they have had bad television reception historically; the KCC thought 
the improvement in transmission and reception facilities would solve this problem. 
Despite fierce competition in the Korean media market, the government contended that the 
digital switchover will serve the public interest in the sense that there would be more choices 
and better quality free-to-view programmings for the public. This path merges an 
increasingly deregulated and Americanized Korean media market with the goals of public 
service broadcasting, similar to the European model. At the same time, the Korean case is 
best described as a top-down, government driven policy process. As the following 
discussions of the pilot studies will reveal, the lack of communications and public 
engagement has seriously delayed this process. 
 
Switch-off lessons from Wuljin, Kangjin and Danyang 
The budget for the 2010 pilot was ￦900 million (£5.14 million), or approximately 
￦1600,000 (£91) per household and ￦70,000 (£40) per person (Shin, 2010a: 34). Table 1 
indicates that the levels of DTV adoption and public awareness and understanding of the 
digital switchover were both relatively low.  
Table 1. Details of a pilot analogue switch-off in Wuljin, Kangjin and Danyang 
 Wuljin Kangjin Danyang 
Population 52,573 40,804 33,990 
Number of households 23,261 18,414 14,706 
Households receiving 
income support* 
2,753 (11.8%) 1,781 (9.7%) 1,317 (9.7%) 
Households receiving 
benefits (just above those 
receiving income 
support)*  
3,803 (16.3%) 9,518 (51.7%) 921 (6.8%) 
Aged 65 or over 11,998 (22.8%) 10,760 (26.4%) 6,877 (21.6%) 
Disabled 4,208 (18.1%) 3,563 (19.3%) 2,800 (20.5%) 
Pay-TV subscriber 
households 
16,837 (72.4%) 13,973 (75.9%) 11,568 (84.8%) 
Households with only 
terrestrial TV (estimate) 
6,404 (27.6%) 4,423 (24.1%) 3,106 (15.2%) 
Households exempt from 
TV licence fees 
9,238 (39.7%) 1,522 (8.3%) 5,916 (40.2%) 
Average number of TV 
per household 
1.39 1.30 1.44 
DTV take-up (%) 17.1 11.3 18 
Awareness and 27.2 21.9 36 
understanding of digital 
switchover (%) 
Analogue switch-off date 1st September 2010  6th October 2010 3rd November 2010 
Sources: The Korea National Statistical Office (November 2009), DTV Korea Survey (3rd October 2009 – 13th 
November 2009) 
*Households in these two categories are eligible to benefit from the Help Scheme by the government with a 
choice of one free DtoA converter or monetary support of approximately £55 per household. 
 
An average of 2.6 percent of all households had not yet converted even after the switch-off 
(Jung 2010c). Most of the non-converted households were either elderly or low-income 
households. The latter group was eligible for a free converter box or monetary support 
(approximately ￡55). This group accounted for 61.4 percent of Kangjin’s population, 28.1 
percent of Wuljin’s population and 16.5 percent of Danyang’s population. However, merely 
21, 28, and 8 households respectively actually benefitted from the plan (Jung 2010c). Despite 
the considerable proportion of the population in need of technical support, support centres 
opened only in early 2010 with limited human staffing. Technical support and 
communication were two problematic issues (Jung 2010; Namgung 2010; Kim 2010). At 
least 80.2 percent of all callers before and immediately after the switch-off date needed help 
installing and using the digital equipment (KCC 2010: 2). Some people sought advice via a 
telephone helpline but most callers required a personal visit by technicians. Second, there was 
a lack of communication to the local residents about the switchover. A survey shows that 
one-third of the residents in the three towns did not know that their towns were ‘selected’ for 
early switch-off (Shin 2010b). More importantly, few of the potential recipients were aware 
of available government assistance (Shin 2010b: 39). There were some positive outcomes in 
the process. First, the level of public awareness and understanding rose to encompass average 
82 percent of the population by the end of 2010 (Jung 2010c). Second, six additional digital 
transmission networks have been established in the region (Shin 2010a: 35). However, public 
complaints so far have outweighed positive experiences with digital television.  
Switch-off lessons from Jeju 
Overall, critics called the Jeju case a ‘catastrophic disaster’ (song 2011). The KCC selected 
Jeju, an island south-east of the Korean mainland, with a total population of 577,187 
(224,713 households) as the first self-governing province for a complete switch-off on June 
29, 2011 (www.jeju.or.kr). A survey in September 2010 showed that 35.4 percent of the 
residents adopted digital television but only 9.1 percent of the elderly households (65 or over) 
did (KCC and RAPA 2011: vi). According to this survey, 90 percent of the local population 
subscribed either cable or satellite channels; the rest relied solely on analogue terrestrial 
television. Conducted only 9 months before the complete switch-off date, the survey stated a 
mere 7.7 percent of Jeju residents knew about the switchover (KCC and RAPA 2011: vii). 
Low levels of public awareness called for more vigorous communications. For two months 
after the switch-off date, several million telephone callers asked for technical support (Song 
2011). Some 4,000 households were without any terrestrial television (MBC News 17th 
August 2011). Public complaints continued as the technical operations to install and repair 
converter boxes took as long as two weeks. A total of 14,000 households received the digital 
converter boxes from the KCC but the DTV Korea reported that 18.8 percent of the recipients 
did not know how to use them even two months after the switch-off date (Kim 2011). One 
local media outlet claimed that Jeju served as a guinea pig (Yoon 2011). The KCC in this 
case was inefficient in dealing with the delivery, the installation and the repair of the free 
converter boxes and their concomitant technical support. The KCC outsourced these services 
to a a few small-scale, local companies, which had limited human resources. The KCC 
blamed an insufficient budget for this problem (Kim 2011), leading to an increase in the 
annual budget for the project (Lee 2011). 
The Future of DTV in Korea: Challenges and recommendations 
The outcomes in the pilot cities have stemmed from deeper problems in Korean 
communications. The division of labour and responsibilities between the entities leading the 
switchover – the KCC, the RAPA, and DTV Korea – was not clearly managed. Operationally, 
the RAPA was responsible for practical matters, such as technical support, and DTV Korea 
was responsible for promotion. Yet switchover funding for these entities was neither 
sufficient nor safeguarded (Yoon and Lee 2010). For example, the KCC proposed the 
installation of 16 Digital Switchover Support Centres nationwide, but it is not clear who 
would run those centres or with what resources or funding. So far the RAPA, which is under 
the KCC’s control, operated the customer call centres, but a survey shows their services have 
not been satisfactory (Jung 2010b). Dissemination of public information was also poor in the 
Korean case; neither the KCC, RAPA, nor DTV Korea has provided daily updates on their 
websites. None of the broadcasters had a lead role in communicating about the digital 
switchover. The experiences in Wuljin, Kangjin, Danyang, and Jeju showed that DTV Korea 
failed in its responsibility to communicate with the public, but at the time, its budget was a 
mere ￡1.4 million, or only 7 percent of the KCC’s annual budget (KCC 2010: 21). Despite a 
3 percent increase in the DTV Korea’s budget in 2011, many critics have argued that a 
greater budget increase is needed for more effective communication campaigns (Jung 2010b; 
Shin 2010: 43; Yoon and Lee 2010). 
The main challenge to the complete digital switchover in South Korea today is analogue 
cable conversion to digital cable for some 1000 million households (Yoon, H.S. 15th March 
2013). The provision of consumer information and support has been poor. Government 
communications were not effectively targeted. It turned out that mere 2.6% of all the 
households eligible for the government support benefitted from the support scheme (Yonhap 
News 28th February 2013). Out of 1,734,000 households who were eligible for the 
government support, only 457,602 households (2.6 percent) had benefitted from the support 
scheme. Those who needed the most help were also most difficult to reach, reproducing a 
‘digital divide’ (Interview with Choi 2010). This shows that while digital television can offer 
many opportunities to some, it also presents a challenge to others, particularly the elderly and 
the disabled (c.f. Evans and Petre 2005: 1003, 1006). The so-called ‘digital divide’ and its 
consequences are a threat to those citizens who, for one reason or another, are not participants 
in electronically mediated networks (Mansell 2002: 407) and therefore face-to-face 
communication is crucial. 
 
Based on the lessons from the pilot towns and the nationwide switchover, three 
recommendations are in order. First, there should be more targeted communication with the 
elderly, the disabled and low-income households among analogue cable subscribers. The 
most effective communication activity in the pilot towns was face-to-face conversations in 
promotion booths located in the town centres (KCC 2010: 4). Public information is a critical 
element of switchover planning and implementation because it involves a type of cultural 
transition beyond simple adaptation. People with less social-technical resources are bound to 
have more difficulties to go through this transition. Human resources for face-to-face 
interaction as well as the use of informal and personal networks could contribute to increased 
public awareness in a network-oriented society like Korea. 
Second, more vigorous advertising could increase public awareness and digital adoption 
among unconverted households. There is currently no campaign targeting these households. 
Advertising carried on cable channels would be most effective and cable services providers 
and TV manufacturers need to share the advertising costs in exchange for including their 
product information, a measure that was undertaken in the UK (Ofcom 2006). 
Third, the introduction of a free-to-view digital platform would increase the level of digital 
adoption. Subscribers to analogue cable services could opt out of pay TV services and instead, 
digital TV services would be available with relatively inexpensive, one-off payment or even 
free of charge if the viewers are eligible for the government support. In 2010, the KBS 
proposed the launch of KoreaView, to target the 9.6 million non-subscribers to multi-channel 
pay TV services (KBS 2010). Based on the UK’s Freeview, KoreaView aimed to provide a 
multi-channel, digital broadcasting service via a cheap set-top box (£27) to those who receive 
only five terrestrial channels. The KBS piloted KoreaView in 500 urban households in 2010, 
and has subsequently run a larger pilot for households with 8 channels in 2011 (KBS 2010). 
The next phase was to increase the number of channels up to 21, in collaboration with other 
terrestrial broadcasters by 2012, but to this day the government has not yet decided how to 
use the extra spectrum. As of January 2013, the KCC has not approved the KBS’s plan 
(Interview with Son 2013).  
Although the KBS is committed to pay for the operational costs and other broadcasters are 
willing to collaborate in terms of sharing their contents, the introduction of the KoreaView 
will also raise a number of issues around digital terrestrial transmission pricing, broadcasters’ 
digital transmission costs, and broadcasters’ new service production costs. Since potential 
multiplex licenses have grown, the pay TV sector has not welcomed KoreView. Nevertheless, 
the KoreaView needs a serious consideration for the digital transmission. Given and Norris 
(2010: 52) and Iosifidis (2005: 57) found that Freeview in the UK played a significant role in 
enhancing consumer interests in digital television services and thus made it possible to switch 
off analogue services. If Korea would have free-to-view digital terrestrial broadcasting 
services, unconverted cable subscribers would be likely to adopt this option. 
One fundamental test of switchover feasibility is an answer to the simple question: why 
should consumers wish to buy digital receivers? According to Starks (2007: 199), the 
consumer motive for buying a new digital receiver could be (a) directly related to the 
equipment, for example, improved picture and sound quality, greater portability/mobility, 
widescreen, or easier navigation and recording; or (b) primarily a function of the new 
services DTV provides, whether new channels or interactive services. These motives are 
relevant to the Koreans as they face a greater diversity in terms of available programs and 
services such as HD programs and Smart TV options. As of December 2010, approximately 
82 percent of all TV programs on the Korean terrestrial channels were in HD (KCC 2010: 3). 
KoreaView would extend the channels and services that Starks suggests in order to motivate 
DTV adoption. 
 
Conclusion 
The transition to digital television in Korea has proven slower than expected. Although the 
country completed the switchover on the 31st of December 2012, some 10 million households 
of analogue cable service subscribers are not yet converted. Examining the European 
experiences, Iosifidis (2011: 4) argues that a free-to-view model, in which public 
broadcasters have a leading role, ensures that the transition to digital television is citizen-
friendly, and that the universality principle is maintained in the digital age. In this context, 
KBS’ KoreaView might facilitate similar outcomes in Korea. The collaboration between the 
public policy and the market is fundamentally important in switchover process. 
“Governments and regulators cannot easily switch off analogue terrestrial 
broadcasting without existing terrestrial broadcasters to digital television – and that 
migration is too risky for the broadcasters unless there is public policy support. 
Neither broadcasters nor the receiver industry will switch out of the analogue market 
fully without some announcement from government of a firm and reliable switchover 
timetable which will be enforced. Consumers will only accept the policy without 
rebelling if they understand the reasons for it, if the consumer proposition offers real 
benefits (one measure of which is voluntary take-up), if the element of compulsion is 
relatively low, and if help is provided to those who will find switching most 
difficult”(Starks 2007: 218). 
Starks describes digital switchover as a kind of mutual risk reduction scheme which is not 
capitalist, not socialist, not a formal public-private sector partnership, nor a joint venture. 
Instead, it is more like a dance, in which the dancers may make up the steps as they go along, 
and they know and respect their positions in relation to one another. Looking at the process 
and trade-offs between competitor services in Korea, it is worth reflecting on decisions that 
will sustain either a viable public service broadcasting model or an expansion of commercial 
services with a shrunken public service broadcasting sector.  
The challenges identified in this article demonstrate that all four major players in Korea need 
to continue collaborating in this ‘dance’ rather than ignoring the unconverted population. 
Digital divide was clearly evident in the process, considering the fact that only 2.6 percent of 
the total households eligible for the government support have actually benefitted from the 
support scheme. Perhaps by following some of the recommendations identified here, it will 
no longer be a partial success. 
 
Notes 
1. All non-English sources used here are author translations. 
2. Although the term digital switchover includes the switch-off for analogue radio, in 
Korea, it is set later than TV and there is no firm target date yet. This study focuses on 
terrestrial broadcasting. 
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